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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 When judges make decisions of real consequence, we normally ex-
pect them to explain themselves. Furthermore, when judges explain 
themselves, we normally expect them to provide reasons why the col-
orable arguments of the losing side were rejected. But should it be 
regarded as reversible error when a trial court fails to satisfy expla-
nation norms, particularly when the reviewing court can readily 
imagine legally adequate reasons for the trial court’s decision? The 
question invites a weighing of competing social interests in judicial 
economy and fair treatment of litigants. As a general matter, appel-
late courts have come down on the side of judicial economy and de-
clined to enforce explanation norms.1 
 Although it is easy to appreciate why courts have not endorsed an 
across-the-board explanation requirement, one can also imagine a 
system in which explanation norms are enforced selectively with re-
spect to discrete categories of judicial decisions. For instance, given 
                                                                                                                    
 *. Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Marquette University Law School. 
Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter. B.A., J.D., Yale University. I am grateful for com-
ments on earlier drafts from Michael Cahill, I. Bennett Capers, Carissa Hessick, Adam 
Kolber, Julian Ku, Katrina Kuh, Ethan Leib, Dan Markel, Alice Ristroph, Mike Simons, 
Steve Vladek, Verity Winship, and Ekow Yankah. I am also grateful for comments from 
participants at a faculty workshop at St. John’s University Law School and from partici-
pants at the 2007 National Sentencing Workshop for Federal Public Defenders. 
 1. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (“The law leaves 
much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Re-
medying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 
764 (2006) (“[W]hat at first appear to be statements of a legal duty to go about the process 
of adjudication in a certain way amount to little more than incantations designed to assure 
the public, and perhaps the judges themselves, that those responsible for adjudication un-
derstand what their obligations entail.”); cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) (“Even within the law itself, decisionmaking devoid of reason-
giving is more prevalent than might at first be apparent.”). 
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the significance of the liberty interests involved, sentencing decisions 
would be an obvious candidate for such enhanced procedural protec-
tions. Indeed, in the wake of important changes to federal sentencing 
law wrought by the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States 
v. Booker,2 it appeared for a short time that the courts might be head-
ing in the direction of heightened explanation requirements in the 
federal sentencing context. More specifically, in United States v. 
Cunningham,3 the Seventh Circuit held that the sentencing judge 
must specifically address nonfrivolous arguments made by a defen-
dant for a sentence below what was recommended by the federal sen-
tencing guidelines (or, to use the federal sentencing lingo, arguments 
for a downward variance).4 Variations on the Cunningham rule were 
endorsed in short order by three other circuits.5  
 Despite these early successes, the tide quickly turned against the 
Cunningham rule. It was rejected in some circuits, whittled away to 
almost nothing in others, and largely eviscerated by a recent Su-
preme Court decision.6 As a result of these developments, federal 
judges are now free in most cases to say little or nothing in response 
to the arguments that defendants make for a variance. When it 
comes to judicial explanation requirements, the once promising op-
portunity for sentencing exceptionalism seems to have evaporated.  
 This Essay considers the rise and fall of the Cunningham rule 
from descriptive and normative perspectives. Part II describes in 
more detail the courts’ flirtation with a robust explanation require-
ment for federal sentences. The story is an illuminating case study of 
how courts adapt new judicial functions to fit old jurisprudential 
forms—the proverbial new wine being poured into old wineskins. 
When the Supreme Court revised federal sentencing law in 2005 to 
provide more discretion for district court judges to vary from the 
guidelines, the Court also created a new and uncertain function for 
the federal appellate courts, which were instructed thenceforth to re-
view sentences for reasonableness.7 Faced then with a variety of rea-
                                                                                                                    
 2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 3. 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 4. Id. at 679. 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 
2006) (vacating sentence on basis of inadequate explanation and noting that the “Seventh 
Circuit has applied the same reasoning to its review of sentences imposed post-Booker” and 
citing Cunningham as authority for requirement that “where a defendant has raised a non-
frivolous argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has 
expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from the record that ‘the 
sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines alone, but . . . consider[ed] whether the 
guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors’ ” (al-
teration in original)); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 6. For a more detailed description of these trends, see infra Parts II.B-D. 
 7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65. 
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sonableness challenges by defendants, the appellate courts drew on 
familiar typologies to categorize and resolve new questions. Some 
challenges were labeled substantive, and some were labeled proce-
dural. Once the substance/procedure divide was imported into rea-
sonableness review, it was natural for courts to analyze questions la-
beled “procedural” (as is typically the case with procedural questions) 
with little regard for the particularities of the substantive setting. 
Thus, the Cunningham question, placed on the procedure side of the 
divide, was treated as a generic explanation issue. Courts unsurpris-
ingly resolved the issue in the generic way, that is, by rejecting a ro-
bust explanation requirement. 
 In Part III, I take up the underlying normative question. I argue 
that once the particularities of the federal sentencing context are 
taken into account, the case for Cunningham is much stronger than 
the courts have recognized. For instance, the Cunningham rule likely 
helps to diminish the effect of subtle cognitive biases that result in 
the guidelines receiving too much weight in the sentencing calculus 
relative to other statutory and constitutional considerations. Addi-
tionally, the Cunningham rule is supported by research on the psy-
chological effects of procedural justice, which suggests that defen-
dants who are treated fairly at sentencing will have more respect for 
the law and legal authorities than defendants who are treated un-
fairly. Thus, they will begin serving their sentences better prepared 
for successful adaptation to prison life and with stronger prospects 
for rehabilitation. In light of these and other considerations specific 
to the federal sentencing context, I conclude with a call for the courts 
to reconsider the post-Cunningham cases that have almost entirely 
sapped the explanation requirement of its vitality.8 
II.   RISE AND FALL OF THE CUNNINGHAM EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT 
 In this Part, I begin with a brief overview of what the Supreme 
Court did in Booker; this overview forms a necessary background to 
the Cunningham story. Next, I proceed to tell the Cunningham story 
in three acts: the development and early (albeit modest) success of 
the Cunningham rule, the undermining of the Cunningham rule by 
the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States,9 and the further whit-
tling away of the rule accomplished by the circuit courts post-Rita. 
                                                                                                                    
 8. The analysis here is not in derogation of broader claims advanced by others that 
judges ought to be responsive more generally to litigants’ arguments. See, e.g., Oldfather, 
supra note 1, at 758 (synthesizing leading theories of adjudication and concluding that the 
“adjudicative duty” requires that judges “both engage with the parties’ arguments and give 
the appearance of having engaged with the parties’ arguments”). Rather, my point is that 
whatever the strength of the arguments for a general explanation requirement, the argu-
ments are especially strong in the specific context of federal sentencing. 
 9. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
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A.   Booker and the Invention of Reasonableness Review 
 Through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress created the 
United States Sentencing Commission and authorized the Commis-
sion to develop binding new sentencing guidelines for the federal 
courts.10 The Commission’s guidelines, which took effect in 1987, 
proved to be quite unpopular with sentencing judges as a result of 
their complexity, rigidity, and harshness, resulting in persistent calls 
for a restoration of judicial discretion in the sentencing process.11  
Finally, after nearly two decades of guidelines sentencing, the  
Supreme Court found the mandatory system unconstitutional in 
Booker and modified the sentencing statute so as to make the system 
more discretionary.12 
 More specifically, Booker determined that the mandatory system 
violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it 
relied on judicial factfinding to determine which sentence enhance-
ments to apply.13 By way of a remedy, the Court simply excised the 
statutory provisions that made the guidelines mandatory, leaving the 
balance of the Sentencing Reform Act in place.14 The Court thereby 
retained the efficiency of judicial factfinding, only now in the service 
of guidelines that became merely “advisory.”15 After the Booker exci-
sion, surviving provisions of the Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) 
required district court judges only to “consider” the guidelines when 
selecting a sentence, alongside several other enumerated factors.16 
Sentencing decisions could still be appealed, but they were subject to 
a revised standard of review: the appellate courts were to “determine 
whether the sentence is unreasonable with regard to § 3553(a).”17 
                                                                                                                    
 10. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 37 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3220. For a more detailed description and assessment of the legislation, see Michael M. 
O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 
772-77 (2006) [hereinafter O’Hear, Original Intent of Uniformity]. 
 11. For a discussion of the guidelines and their reception, see O’Hear, Original Intent 
of Uniformity, supra note 10, at 777-85. 
 12. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) requires judges also to “consider” the 
need for the sentence imposed: 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal con-
duct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 
 17. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). For a critique of 
Booker’s treatment of appellate review, highlighting tensions between the new standard of 
review for sentences and traditional appellate functions, see Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. 
Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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B. Rise of the Cunningham Rule 
 Left with little clear guidance from the Supreme Court on how to 
do a reasonableness review, the circuit courts of appeals were faced 
with a daunting task: uncharted waters had to be charted swiftly to 
handle the steady traffic of sentencing appeals emerging from the 
trial courts. The appellate courts responded to the exigencies of the 
situation by assimilating Booker as far as possible to the pre-Booker 
sentencing process.18 Trial courts were thus commanded to first com-
pute the applicable guidelines range, just as they had been doing all 
along, and only then to consider the possibility of a sentence outside 
the range.19 Moreover, if a sentence were imposed within the range, 
most circuits decided that it should be presumed reasonable.20 
 At the same time, the courts recognized that the presumption of 
reasonableness could, at least in principle, be rebutted;21 to hold oth-
erwise would seem inconsistent with Booker’s rejection of mandatory 
guidelines.22 The appellate courts thus had to develop additional 
principles to govern reasonableness review. Separate substantive 
and procedural components of reasonableness were recognized.23 In 
the substantive aspect of review, the appellate court had to deter-
mine whether the district court reached a “defensible overall re-
sult,”24 taking into account the § 3553(a) factors.25 
 As to procedural reasonableness, Judge Posner offered the first 
extended treatment of the topic in his opinion for a Seventh Circuit 
panel in United States v. Cunningham.26 His thoughts were 
prompted by a post-Booker sentencing in which the district court 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In considera-
tion of the § 3553(a) factors, a trial court must calculate the correct guidelines range appli-
cable to a defendant’s particular circumstances. As before Booker, the standard of proof 
under the guidelines for sentencing facts continues to be preponderance of the evidence.” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“This duty 
to ‘consider’ the Guidelines will ordinarily require the sentencing judge to determine the 
applicable Guidelines range even though the judge is not required to sentence within that 
range. The Guideline range should be determined in the same manner as before Book-
er/Fanfan.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330; United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111-12 
(2d Cir. 2005); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519; United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 675 
(7th Cir. 2005). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675. A minority of circuits rejected the presumption of reason-
ableness. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (describing alignment of 
circuits on this issue). 
 21. See, e.g., Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675. 
 22. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331; Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115; United States v. Webb, 
403 F.3d 373, 385 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 23. See, e.g., Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117. 
 24. United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 937-39 (6th Cir. 2006) (illustrating 
substantive review based on the § 3553(a) factors). 
 26. 429 F.3d at 679. 
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seemingly gave no consideration to a defendant’s argument for a 
variance based on his long history of psychiatric illness and sub-
stance abuse.27 “[W]hat duty if any,” queried Posner, “has the judge 
to explain his reasoning in imposing a guidelines sentence when the 
defendant contends that such a sentence would be unreasonable?”28 
The government’s position, as summarized by Posner, was that the 
“judge could have a stamp that said ‘I have considered the statutory 
factors,’ which he placed on every guidelines sentence that he im-
posed—that would be okay.”29 Posner, however, rejected this position 
as inconsistent with the availability of appellate review: 
[W]henever a district judge is required to make a discretionary rul-
ing that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves, 
before we can conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, 
that he exercised his discretion, that is, that he considered the fac-
tors relevant to that exercise.30 
 At the same time, Posner also rejected the opposite extreme posi-
tion: “A sentencing judge has no more duty than we appellate judges 
do to discuss every argument made by a litigant; arguments clearly 
without merit can, and for the sake of judicial economy should, be 
passed over in silence.”31 Posner thus suggested a procedural re-
quirement keyed to the strength of the defendant’s arguments for a 
downward variance: arguments “clearly without merit” could be re-
jected without explanation, while other arguments would require a 
more meaningful response than simply, “I considered the statutory 
factors and decided to impose a guidelines sentence.”32 
 Of course, the line between clearly without merit and arguably 
with merit is not an entirely certain one, and Posner himself did not 
offer a clear rule to distinguish the two categories. Yet, his assess-
ment of the specifics of Mr. Cunningham’s case (and his decision that 
Mr. Cunningham’s sentence should be vacated) at least pointed in 
the direction of additional considerations that might help appellate 
courts to decide whether an argument required a specific response: 
We cannot have much confidence in the judge’s considered atten-
tion to the factors in this case, when he passed over in silence the 
principal argument made by the defendant even though the argu-
ment was not so weak as not to merit discussion, as it would have 
been if anyone acquainted with the facts would have known with-
out being told why the judge had not accepted the argument. Di-
minished mental capacity is a ground stated in the sentencing 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Id. at 677-68. 
 28. Id. at 676. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 679 (citations omitted). 
 31. Id. at 678. 
 32.  See id. at 679. 
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guidelines themselves for a lower sentence. A judge who fails to 
mention a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a fac-
tual basis) is likely to have committed an error or oversight.33 
Posner thus suggested attention to these factors (without suggesting 
that any single one of them was dispositive): (1) whether the argu-
ment in question was one of the principal ones advanced by the de-
fendant; (2) whether the argument was based on a factor previously 
recognized in the law as an acceptable basis for a below-guidelines 
sentence; and (3) whether the reasons for rejecting the argument 
would have been self-evident to “anyone acquainted with the facts.”34 
 Cunningham’s explanation requirement, which seemingly broke 
with earlier decisions in the Fifth35 and Eleventh Circuits,36 was en-
dorsed in short order by the Third37 and Tenth Circuits.38 Addition-
ally, the Sixth Circuit adopted the same requirement but without cit-
ing Cunningham.39 Notably, however, none of these decisions rested 
in any important way on anything specific to the sentencing context. 
Rather, Cunningham and its progeny all turn primarily on the  
usefulness of district court explanations to facilitate appellate re-
view.40 But the same consideration would seemingly apply to any re-
viewable exercise of discretion by a district court judge. Moreover, 
Cunningham itself invoked the countervailing concern for  
judicial economy that typically dominates the consideration of expla-
nation requirements.41 
 Given that Cunningham itself framed the sentencing explanation 
issue as a generic question of judicial process, there should be little 
surprise that even the pro-Cunningham circuits tended to give Cun-
                                                                                                                    
 33. Id. (citation omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“When the judge 
exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the 
record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”). 
 36. See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district 
court explicitly acknowledged that it had considered Scott’s arguments at sentencing and 
that it had considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a). This statement alone is sufficient 
in post-Booker sentences.”). 
 37. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 38. See United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 39. See United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Where a de-
fendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect 
both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge ex-
plained the basis for rejecting it.”). 
 40. See, e.g., id. (“[Explanation] assures . . . that the reviewing court can intelligently 
determine whether the specific sentence is indeed reasonable.”); United States v. Cun-
ningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]henever a district judge is required to 
make a discretionary ruling that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy our-
selves, before we can conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he exercised 
his discretion, that is, that he considered the factors relevant to that exercise.”). 
 41. See Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 678 (“[A]rguments clearly without merit can, and 
for the sake of judicial economy should, be passed over in silence.”). 
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ningham a crabbed reading.42 Indeed, in the year and a half between 
Cunningham and Rita, only one additional sentence was clearly va-
cated on the basis of a Cunningham violation,43 while many decisions 
rejected Cunningham-type claims.44 Thus, for instance, district 
courts were permitted to pass in silence over arguments where the 
defendant failed to explain how the mitigating factors he relied on 
(military service and difficult childhood) diminished his culpability45 
and where the argument was unsupported by any evidence beyond 
the defendant’s “own self-serving testimony.”46 Courts have also sug-
gested that little explanation is required when the district court re-
jects an argument that is not the defendant’s “principal argument.”47 
 Vague in many respects, Cunningham could have been read to es-
tablish the sort of robust explanation requirement for sentencing 
that courts have generally resisted in other contexts. Instead, subse-
quent decisions tended to resolve uncertainties against a strong rule. 
The Supreme Court effectively confirmed this trend in Rita v.  
United States. 
C.   Rita: From Explicit to Implicit Explanation 
 The Court offered its first major statement on post-Booker federal 
sentencing in the case of Victor Rita. A jury convicted Rita of perjury 
and related offenses based on false statements that he made in con-
nection with a grand jury investigation.48 With his guidelines sen-
tencing range calculated at thirty-three to forty-one months,49 he 
sought a downward variance based on three factors: (1) as a result of 
his career in law enforcement, he faced a risk of retribution from 
other inmates while in prison; (2) he was a decorated veteran of the 
Armed Forces; and (3) he suffered from a variety of medical condi-
                                                                                                                    
 42. In light of the way the issue was framed, the real surprise is that an explanation 
requirement was adopted at all. One way to make sense of the rule is to view it as a re-
sponse to the pressure created by Booker for the appellate courts to establish some basis on 
which guidelines sentences might occasionally be overturned; otherwise, the guidelines 
would appear to have retained much of their (unconstitutional) mandatory character. And 
establishing procedural grounds for reversal would no doubt have appeared conceptually 
easier than establishing substantive limitations based on what Posner has labeled the “va-
gue and prolix” § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 679. 
 43. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1118. 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 474 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Tyra, 454 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 45. United States v. Brock, 433 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 46. Acosta, 474 F.3d at 1004. 
 47. See id. (noting, in rejecting defendant’s Cunningham claim, that neglected argu-
ment “was not her principal argument”); United States v. Sankey, 169 F. App’x 484, 487 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“Although we conclude that Mr. Sankey did voice these themes at sentenc-
ing, he did so only obliquely; they were hardly his ‘principal argument,’ and so the district 
court was not required to elaborate in rejecting them.”). 
 48. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459-60 (2007). 
 49. Id. at 2461. 
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tions.50 After Rita presented evidence and argument relating to these 
factors, the judge asked questions about each of them, but nonethe-
less chose to impose the guidelines sentence.51 He offered only a brief 
explanation of his decision: the Court was “ ‘unable to find that the 
[presentence investigation] [report’s recommended] sentencing guide-
line range . . . is an inappropriate guideline range for that, and under 
3553 . . . the public needs to be protected . . . .’ ”52 The judge con-
cluded that “ ‘the Court finds that it is appropriate to enter a sen-
tence at the bottom of the Guidelines range.’ ”53 
 The Fourth Circuit affirmed based on its presumption of reason-
ableness for sentences imposed within the guidelines54 and granted 
certiorari.55 In its decision, the Supreme Court first ruled that appel-
late courts may indeed employ a presumption of reasonableness56 and 
then affirmed the substantive reasonableness of Rita’s sentence.57 
 As to procedural reasonableness—the final (and, for our purposes, 
most important) issue in the case—it is clear that Rita would have 
had a strong claim in the pro-Cunningham circuits that he was enti-
tled to some sort of specific explanation as to why his proposed 
grounds for a variance were rejected. After all, these constituted his 
principal arguments—indeed, his only arguments—at sentencing,58 
their legal merit had been previously recognized,59 and the support-
ing evidence was apparently uncontested.60 Although the district 
court judge expressly acknowledged the substance of Rita’s argu-
ments,61 it hardly seems a meaningful response to those arguments 
for the judge to explain his sentencing decision merely with the con-
                                                                                                                    
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2461-62. 
 52. Id. at 2462 (quoting transcript). 
 53. Id. (quoting transcript). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 2469-70. 
 58. See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting sig-
nificance of “principal” argument in procedural reasonableness analysis). 
 59. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111-13 (1996) (upholding permissibility of 
departure based on police officer defendants’ special vulnerability to abuse in prison); 
United States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging permissibility of 
departure based on military service in unusual cases); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2006) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL] (“Physical condi-
tion . . . is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted. 
However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward . . . 
.” (emphasis added)); id. § 5H1.11 (“Military . . . service . . . [is] not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a departure is warranted.” (emphasis added)). 
 60. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2461-62 (noting that the government argued that offense 
severity and culpability warranted a guidelines sentence but not indicating that the gov-
ernment countered Rita’s evidence with contrary evidence). 
 61. Id. at 2461. 
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clusory assertion that a guidelines sentence was appropriate. Yet, the 
Supreme Court affirmed.62 
 Rita did not cite or discuss Cunningham, but it did recognize a 
need for appellate courts to ensure that the sentencing process was a 
reasoned one.63 At the same time, the Court made clear that judges 
were not required to express their reasons, but they might instead 
rely on context and inference to supply implicit reasoning: 
[W]e cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a 
full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length, 
conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon 
circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every ar-
gument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes 
the word “granted,” or “denied” on the face of a motion while rely-
ing upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the rea-
sons clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own 
professional judgment. 
 . . . [W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a 
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy ex-
planation. Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests 
his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guide-
lines sentence is a proper sentence . . . in the typical case, and that 
the judge has found that the case before him is typical.64 
 Even as to cases in which a colorable argument was advanced for 
a variance, the Court hedged its language to avoid implying a duty to 
address the argument expressly: “Where the defendant or prosecutor 
presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, . . . 
the judge will normally . . . explain why he has rejected those argu-
ments.”65 Here, the Court seemed merely to describe what is usually 
done, avoiding the use of such words as “shall” or “must” that would 
connote some sense of obligation. 
 Thus, while the judge in Rita may not have done what other 
judges normally do, the lack of explanation did not violate any  
legal duty: 
We acknowledge that the judge might have said more. He might 
have added explicitly that he had heard and considered the evi-
dence and argument; that . . . he thought the Commission in the 
Guidelines had determined a sentence that was proper in the min-
erun of roughly similar perjury cases; and that he found that Rita’s 
personal circumstances here were simply not different enough to 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Id. at 2470. 
 63. See id. at 2468 (“In the present context, a statement of reasons is important. The 
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has consid-
ered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal deci-
sionmaking authority.”). 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. (emphasis added). 
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warrant a different sentence. But context and the record make 
clear that this, or similar, reasoning, underlies the judge’s conclu-
sion. Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at 
hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge consid-
ered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law re-
quires the judge to write more extensively.66 
 The Court’s analysis here may seem qualified (“[w]here a matter 
is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand”),67 but it is hard to 
see how the matter in Rita was simpler than in any other case in 
which a defendant argues for a variance based on the presence of 
unusual circumstances (say, Cunningham, for instance). Indeed, this 
is precisely the typical form that variance requests take: defendants 
say, in effect, “Judge, there is something unusual about my case.”68 
Under the Court’s reasoning, there is no real obligation for the sen-
tencing judge to explain a rejection of this sort of claim; the appellate 
court will simply infer that the judge determined the case was “not 
different enough” (at least if the judge made some sort of bare ac-
knowledgement of the defendant’s arguments on the record, as the 
judge had done in Rita), and this implicit explanation will be  
deemed adequate. 
 In sum, Rita effectively transformed a requirement for explicit ex-
planation into a requirement for no more than implicit explanation. 
It set the bar so low that the requirement can seemingly be satisfied 
in nearly all cases by a bare acknowledgement of the defendant’s ar-
guments for a variance. Moreover, by framing the procedural reason-
ableness question as a generic explanation issue (for instance, by in-
voking the practice of busy trial court judges “simply writ[ing] the 
word ‘granted,’ or ‘denied’ on the face of a motion”69 as a relevant 
point of reference), Rita reinforced the view that nothing fundamen-
tal differentiates sentencing explanations from explanations for more 
routine types of decisions.70 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Id. at 2469. 
 67. Id. 
 68. This sort of argument for a below-guidelines sentence might be contrasted with an 
argument based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines, taking the generic form of 
the following: “Judge, my case may be typical, but the guidelines don’t handle cases of my 
type in a way that is consistent with 3553(a).” Recently, the Supreme Court authorized 
downward variances in response to such arguments in a crack-cocaine case. Kimbrough v. 
United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007). However, because the Court’s analysis empha-
sized the unusual history of the crack-cocaine guideline (which has been disavowed by the 
Sentencing Commission itself), it is still not clear how broad the district court’s authority is 
to grant a variance based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines. See id. 
 69. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 70. To be sure, one might argue that Rita actually improved the lot of defendants with 
Cunningham claims in those circuits that had not adopted the Cunningham rule; by going 
to all of the trouble of showing how an explanation for Rita’s sentence might be inferred 
from the record, the Court might be seen as implicitly acknowledging the existence of an 
explanation requirement. On the other hand, such a victory for defendants in the non-
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D.   After Rita: A New Hurdle for Cunningham Claims 
 As appellants advanced Cunningham claims after Rita, they had 
to surmount two difficult hurdles established by the case law. First, 
the pre-Rita cases suggested stringent limitations on what argu-
ments would trigger an explanation requirement (e.g., only the de-
fendant’s “principal argument”71). Second, Rita indicated that the ex-
planation requirement (even in the narrow circumstances in which it 
was actually triggered) could be satisfied in most cases by inferences 
drawn from the sentencing judge’s bare acknowledgement of the de-
fendant’s arguments.72 
 The post-Rita cases then raised a third important hurdle, with at 
least two circuits thus far holding that defendants are obligated to 
                                                                                                                    
Cunningham circuits could only be regarded as a hollow one given how low the bar was set 
for satisfying the explanation requirement. This dynamic was apparent in the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s post-Rita decision in United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), in 
which the court seemed to accept some variation of the Cunningham rule. See id. at 992-93 
(citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468) (“[W]hen a party raises a specific, nonfrivolous argument . . 
. in support of a requested sentence, then the judge should normally explain why he ac-
cepts or rejects the party’s position.”). Nonetheless, Carty found the rule satisfied based on 
the case’s similarities to Rita. Id. at 995. 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 47. For a post-Rita case that rests on similar 
reasoning, see United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 694-95 (7th Cir. 2008), which ex-
plains that sentencing judge need not specifically address “stock” arguments by defendant 
at sentencing. 
 72. For an example of a post-Rita case that turned on the court’s recognition that Rita 
substantially curtailed the explanation requirement in this way, see United States v. Liou, 
491 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2007). The defendant, Liou, argued for a variance based on his fam-
ily and business responsibilities. Id. at 336. Even though the sentencing judge “did not spe-
cifically explain why it was not more moved by Liou’s family circumstances or why they 
were less of a concern than the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense and to promote respect for the law,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 340. The court’s 
decision was based on a brief comment made by the sentencing judge as to voluntary sur-
render: “ ‘Now, the Court is going to permit Mr. Liou to voluntarily surrender . . . and in 
light of his family circumstances and in light of his business, the Court is going to give him 
60 days to put his affairs in order before reporting to serve this sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript). In holding this was an adequate response to Liou’s argu-
ments, the Sixth Circuit found the case similar to Rita: “[A]s in Rita, ‘context and the re-
cord make clear’ that the sentencing judge understood Liou’s family and business obliga-
tions but did not believe they outweighed other § 3553(a) factors that the judge found more 
pertinent.” Id. (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469). Moreover, recent decisions have sug-
gested that Rita contravened “robust[]” readings of precedent that established an explana-
tion requirement. Id. at 339 n.4; see also United States v. Perez-Perez, 512 F.3d 514, 515-
16 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Cunningham-type claim in light of Rita); United States v. Bo-
nilla, 524 F.3d 647, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 For a contrasting example of a post-Rita case that seemingly failed to recognize the 
significance of Rita for procedural reasonableness review, see United States v. Miranda, 
505 F.3d 785, 791-92, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). Curiously, the court cited Rita, not as potentially 
undermining, but as supporting Cunningham. Id. at 796. Quoting the language in Rita, 
which indicated that the judge “will normally” explain why he has rejected a defendant’s 
arguments, the Seventh Circuit characterized Rita as “clarif[ying] the need for a district 
court to explain its response to nonfrivolous arguments.” Id. Miranda thus transformed a 
seemingly descriptive statement from the Supreme Court (“will normally”) into a prescrip-
tive one. 
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make a contemporaneous objection to a sentencing judge’s failure to 
explain.73 If no objection is made at the sentencing hearing, then the 
issue will be reviewed by the appellate court under the highly defer-
ential plain error standard.74 In effect, this means that the sentenc-
ing hearing becomes a trap for the unwary, with inexperienced or in-
attentive counsel costing defendants the ability to advance Cunning-
ham claims on appeal. 
 The objection rule is justified, of course, on grounds of judicial 
economy: it is more efficient to have the judge explain the sentence at 
the time it is imposed than in a separate hearing after an appeal.75 
Indeed, for analogous reasons, express objection is a common re-
quirement for procedural errors outside the sentencing context.76 No-
tably, however, a defendant may freely appeal the length of a sen-
tence without objecting at the sentencing hearing.77 Thus, the objec-
tion rule nicely illustrates the significance of treating Cunningham 
problems as generic procedural issues. Although the substance of a 
sentence need not be specifically preserved for appeal, an explana-
tion failure—placed on the other side of the substance/procedure di-
vide—is viewed in such a way that concerns for judicial economy be-
come paramount and any sentencing-specific considerations recede 
into the background. 
III.   A SENTENCING-SPECIFIC CASE FOR THE CUNNINGHAM RULE 
 In the tumultuous first few months after Booker, four circuits that 
were struggling with the challenge of giving content to reasonable-
ness review expressly endorsed what I have referred to as the Cun-
ningham explanation requirement:78 the sentencing judge must ex-
pressly respond to all nonfrivolous arguments made by a defendant 
for a downward variance. However, the four Cunningham circuits 
failed to develop a conceptual foundation for this requirement that 
connected it to the specifics of the sentencing context. Not surpris-
ingly then, concerns about judicial economy seem to have overcome 
the initial burst of interest in the explanation requirement. The 
                                                                                                                    
 73. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United 
States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 74. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. 
 75. See id. at 391 (stating that the objection requirement “has the salutary effect of 
encouraging the resolution of those issues at the sentencing hearing—when they matter 
most and when they can be most readily resolved”). 
 76. Id. at 385; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) (establishing the general rule that issues 
are preserved for later review by making a contemporaneous objection). 
 77. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389. 
 78. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 
550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678-79 (7th  
Cir. 2005). 
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Cunningham rule has little apparent life today outside of the Sixth 
Circuit,79 and even in that circuit, there has been a spirited pushback 
through the adoption of a contemporaneous objection requirement.80 
 Although not recognized by the courts, a good sentencing-specific 
case can be made for the Cunningham rule. Demanding explanations 
in this context need not open the door to a flood of Cunningham-type 
claims with respect to more routine judicial decisions. Rather, sen-
tencing may be viewed as a type of decision subject to its own distinct 
normative mandates—mandates that apply to sentencing procedure 
no less than sentencing substance and that properly inform any  
determination of whether a sentence has been imposed in a reason-
able manner. 
 Numerous justifications exist for developing the sentencing-
specific case for the Cunningham rule. First, requiring judges to ad-
dress arguments for downward variances diminishes the cognitive 
biases that result from calculating the guidelines range at the outset 
of the sentencing process, thereby improving the substantive quality 
of sentencing decisions. Second, responding to defendant arguments 
(even if they are ultimately rejected) communicates a message of re-
spect for defendants, strengthening what social psychologists call 
“procedural justice effects,”81 thereby advancing fundamental pur-
poses of the Sentencing Reform Act.82 Third, the explanation re-
quirement enhances the reality and perception of compliance with 
the constitutional mandate of Booker that the guidelines may not be 
treated as binding. Finally, the explanation requirement advances 
the Sentencing Reform Act’s goal of evolutionary sentencing guide-
lines that are progressively improved by the Sentencing Commission 
over time.83 
 These four considerations are described in greater detail in the 
Sections that follow. In light of these concerns, the courts ought to 
reconsider the various doctrines (for instance, the permissibility of 
implicit explanations and the principal argument and contemporane-
ous objection requirements) that have sapped the Cunningham rule 
of its vitality.84 
                                                                                                                    
 79. For an example of a recent Sixth Circuit case in which a defendant prevailed on a 
Cunningham-type claim, see United States v. Peters, 512 F.3d 787, 788-89 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
 81. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
 82. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
 83. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 63-64 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 3182, 
3246-47; see also GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 1A1.1 cmt. background (noting the 
Act empowered the Commission with ongoing responsibilities to monitor the guidelines 
and make appropriate changes). 
 84. I leave for another day, as Cunningham itself did, a full elaboration of what pre-
cisely a district court judge should be required to do in order to satisfy the explanation re-
quirement. It is, of course, too much to expect strict scientific or syllogistic disproof of de-
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A.   Improving the Substantive Quality of Sentencing Decisions 
 In the post-Booker world, sentences are to be based on the full set 
of § 3553(a) factors, of which the advisory guidelines range is only 
one.85 Thus, there would be grounds to worry about the substantive 
quality of sentencing decisions if the guidelines range were system-
atically given a greater weight than any of the other § 3553(a) fac-
tors.86 Yet, the post-Booker case law has precisely that effect insofar 
as it mandates that sentencing judges calculate the guidelines range 
before they evaluate any of the other § 3553(a) factors.87 As a large 
body of cognitive psychology research has demonstrated, the order of 
the steps in a decisionmaking process (here, considering the guide-
lines first and then grounds for variance under § 3553(a) later) can 
exert a powerful influence over the outcomes reached, triggering a 
                                                                                                                    
fendants’ claims; the theories of punishment embraced by § 3553(a) are too indeterminate 
to permit such decisive disproof. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations 
on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues of Randomization (A Polemic and 
Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century), 74 SOC. RES. 307, 318-21 (2007) (identifying diffi-
culties with deterrence theory). I have in mind more what Professor Mashaw has referred 
to as a “thinner sense of rationality.” JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 199 (1985). In any event, as Professor Schauer’s analysis of reason-
giving suggests, explanation should normally invoke some form of general principle: 
“[O]rdinarily, to provide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a princi-
ple of greater generality than the decision itself. When we provide a reason for a particular 
decision, we typically provide a rule, principle, standard, norm, or maxim broader than the 
decision itself . . . .” Schauer, supra note 1, at 641 (emphasis omitted). 
 Nor would I necessarily contemplate written opinions. See generally Chad M. Oldfa-
ther, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008) 
(discussing costs and benefits of written opinions). It is also an interesting question 
whether the Cunningham requirement should extend to government requests for upward 
variances. Some justifications I offer for Cunningham apply equally to government and de-
fendant requests (e.g., strengthening the feedback loop to the Sentencing Commission) and 
some do not (e.g., advancing rehabilitation prospects through procedural justice effects). 
Similarly, many of these justifications apply with comparable force to sentencing in state 
courts, although I ultimately ground much of the argument here on the particular history 
and law of federal sentencing, and my conclusions are accordingly limited to that setting. 
 85. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 86. To be sure, one might argue that there can be no conflict between the guidelines 
and § 3553(a) because the Commission itself has been required to develop the guidelines in 
light of the § 3553(a) factors. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006). Yet, even the Commission has 
not claimed that the guidelines fully account for all factors relevant to the sentencing deci-
sion, which is why the guidelines endorsed the use of “departures” even before Booker. See, 
e.g., GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 1A1.1 ed. note (reprinting introductory note to 
original 1987 edition of Guidelines Manual, at A.4(b)) (explaining that a departure mecha-
nism was adopted, in part, because of “the difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a single 
set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to 
a sentencing decision”). Moreover, the guidelines have been subject to considerable criti-
cism for their failure to implement a coherent theory of just punishment, which is one of 
the § 3553(a) factors, and for their neglect of offender characteristics, which is another. 
See, e.g., O’Hear, Original Intent of Uniformity, supra note 10, at 780-81; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3553(a)(1)-(2)(A) (2006). Thus, variances from the guidelines should not be regarded as 
necessarily, or even presumptively, inconsistent with § 3553(a). 
 87. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007) (“[A] district court should be-
gin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”). 
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number of different forms of cognitive bias that (in this setting) will 
tend to give more weight to the guidelines and diminish the attention 
paid to the other § 3553(a) considerations raised by the defendant.88 
 First, there is the anchoring effect: a large body of research indi-
cates “that the articulation of a number—even an arbitrarily selected 
number—at the start of a decision-making process may play an im-
portant role in shaping the final outcome.”89 Thus, the initial articu-
lation of the numbers constituting the guidelines range may cause 
those numbers to exert an important gravitational pull on the ulti-
mate sentencing decision.90 
 Second, there is the phenomenon of belief perseverance: as people 
process new information, they generate theories about its meaning 
and significance; information received later tends to be assimilated to 
the theory.91 In the guidelines context, calculating the guidelines sen-
tence first means that the judge will focus initially on the informa-
tion made relevant by the guidelines, which overwhelmingly tends to 
be aggravating in nature: the harm caused by the offense, the dan-
gerousness of the defendant’s conduct, and the defendant’s criminal 
history.92 In the face of such information, the judge is apt to form a 
theory that the offense was a severe one and the defendant is a de-
praved person. Variance-related information, by contrast, will tend to 
                                                                                                                    
 88. None of this is to say, of course, that guidelines sentences are inevitable—a con-
clusion that is demonstrably false. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT 1 (2007) (indicating that only 60.8% of cases were sentenced within the guidelines 
range in fiscal year 2007). However, the frequency of below-range sentences is a mislead-
ing indicator of how open judges are to defendant requests for a variance, as more than 
two-thirds of below-range sentences are jointly requested by both defendant and prosecutor 
and thus offer judges the very attractive prospect of a consensual resolution unlikely to be 
appealed. Id. The real test of a judge’s receptivity to variance requests is in the cases in 
which he or she is resisted by the government. With respect to these cases, the cognitive 
psychology literature gives us reason to be concerned that judges are giving undue weight 
to the guidelines, which might be manifest both in variance rates and in the magnitude of 
variances granted. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
 89. Michael M. O’Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 645 (2006) [hereinafter O’Hear, Duty 
to Avoid Disparity]; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2515-19 (2004) (describing the anchoring effect). To be sure, 
it is important to realize that the strength of this and other forms of cognitive bias may 
vary considerably among different individuals and in different situations and the results of 
laboratory studies (typically involving undergraduate students) should not be uncritically 
ascribed to highly educated decisionmakers operating in professional settings. Gregory 
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behav-
ioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-73 (2002). Studies of 
judges, however, do indicate that judicial decisions are hardly immune from anchoring ef-
fects and other forms of bias. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges De-
cide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-29 (2007). 
 90. O’Hear, Duty to Avoid Disparity, supra note 89, at 645. 
 91. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 608-14 (2002). 
 92. O’Hear, Original Intent of Uniformity, supra note 10, at 778-78, 781. 
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be mitigating facts regarding the defendant’s difficult upbringing and 
economic circumstances, cognitive limitations, mental illness, family 
responsibilities, prior good works, postoffense rehabilitative efforts, 
and the like. Assimilated to an earlier-formed theory of depravity, 
however, this information is easily discounted: for instance, the pres-
entation of difficulties in life may be seen as an attempt to shift re-
sponsibility for the offense to others; cognitive limitations and mental 
illness may be seen as support for the view that the defendant is a 
dangerously unstable person with poor prospects for rehabilitation; 
and postoffense rehabilitative efforts may be seen as insincere  
and self-serving. 
 Finally, the guidelines may be given more weight as a result of 
cognitive dissonance effects: in general, those who are required to 
expend considerable effort or perform onerous tasks in order to 
achieve a goal will tend to view that goal more favorably as a result.93 
The calculation of guidelines sentences is viewed by many judges as 
an onerous task, and it sometimes requires considerable judicial ef-
fort,94 particularly where there are factual or legal disputes as to the 
scope of relevant conduct, magnitude of loss, role in the offense, and 
the like. Sentencing hearings can often become multiday bench tri-
als.95 In such cases, judges may view the guidelines range as more sa-
lient simply as a result of the effort expended in its calculation. 
 Fortunately, researchers have identified certain types of proce-
dural safeguards that reduce cognitive bias in decisionmaking. For 
instance, “directing experimental subjects to consider alternative or 
opposing arguments, positions, or evidence has been found to amelio-
rate the adverse effects of several biases, including the primacy or 
anchoring effect [and the] biased assimilation of new evidence.”96 The 
Cunningham explanation requirement, of course, helps to ensure 
that such consideration of alternative or opposing arguments occurs 
before a guidelines sentence is imposed. Moreover, an explanation 
requirement has been found, in and of itself, to diminish some forms 
of cognitive bias.97 More generally, the explanation requirement can 
                                                                                                                    
 93. Stern, supra note 91, at 612. 
 94. See Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1997) (“[T]he Guidelines require judges to address 
many quantitative and definitional issues in excruciating detail . . . .”). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Olivero, 552 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (two-day sen-
tencing hearing); United States v. Acosta-Roman, 549 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2008) (four-day 
sentencing hearing on applicability of single six-level enhancement); United States v. Grif-
fin, 510 F.3d 354, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that sentencing hearing included four days  
of testimony). 
 96. Mitchell, supra note 89, at 133. 
 97. See Guthrie et al., supra note 89, at 36-38 (discussing how explanation require-
ments often induce deliberation and reduce intuitive or impressionistic reactions that may 
be biased); Mitchell, supra note 89, at 134-35 (noting how explanation requirements may 
reduce certain gain/loss framing effects in choice). 
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be seen as a way to enhance accountability,98 which can “attenuate 
biases that arise from lack of self-critical attention to one’s decision 
processes and failure to use all relevant cues.”99 
 Nonetheless, adopting new safeguards to reduce cognitive bias in 
a decisionmaking process does not always result in a net gain: the 
transaction costs may outweigh the benefits of substantively im-
proved decisions. It is important to remember, however, what is at 
stake in the sentencing decision. The extraordinary deprivation of 
liberty represented by extended incarceration stands out as perhaps 
the most significant decision that can be made by a judge—certainly 
far more so than, say, monetary awards in civil cases or routine case 
management orders. Our constitutional due process jurisprudence 
properly recognizes that the need for reliable decisionmaking is at its 
zenith when the individual interests at stake are most important.100 
The same logic justifies enhanced safeguards under the rubric of pro-
cedural reasonableness to increase the quality of sentencing deci-
sions, particularly when it is clear that the structure of the decision-
making process is bound to create biases in favor of just one of sev-
eral statutorily mandated sentencing factors.101 
B.   Improving the Procedural Quality of Sentencing Decisions 
 Procedural safeguards have a value that goes beyond their contri-
bution to accurate, well-considered outcomes. A rational, responsive 
decisionmaking process conveys a message of respect for the basic 
human dignity of the individuals affected by the decision, regardless 
of the ultimate content of the decision. Professor Mashaw has devel-
oped this insight in a particularly influential fashion in his dignitary 
theory of due process.102 Of particular relevance for present purposes, 
                                                                                                                    
 98. Mitchell, supra note 89, at 135. 
 99. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountabil-
ity, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 265 (1999). 
 100. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (“[T]he degree of potential 
deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in as-
sessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that the liberty lost when parole is revoked constitutes a 
“grievous loss” and warrants due process protections). 
 101. To some extent, substantive problems may be rectified on appeal through sub-
stantive reasonableness review. On the other hand, not all substantively flawed sentences 
are appealed, appealed competently, or reviewed capably by a conscientious appellate 
panel, so it may still be worthwhile to provide the extra procedural safeguard. More fun-
damentally, substantive reasonableness review determines only whether the sentence is 
defensible and not whether a better sentence might have been imposed. See supra note 24 
and accompanying text. Even assuming that this minimal requirement is satisfied in all 
cases, the Cunningham rule may still have value in directing the attention of district court 
judges to factors that establish the preferability of a below-guidelines sentence. 
 102. For the most complete elaboration of this theory, see generally MASHAW, supra 
note 84, at 158-238. For a discussion of the significance of Professor Mashaw’s work, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 263 (2004), which stated 
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Mashaw emphasizes the value of comprehensibility and rationality 
in a decisionmaking process: 
[Incomprehensible processes] take away the participants’ ability to 
engage in rational planning about their situation, to make in-
formed choices among options. The process implicitly defines the 
participants as objects, subject to infinite manipulation by the sys-
tem. To avoid contributing to this sense of alienation, terror, and 
ultimately self-hatred, a decisional process must give participants 
adequate notice of the issues to be decided, of the evidence that is 
relevant to those issues, and of how the decisional process itself 
works. In the end, there also must be some guarantee, usually by 
articulation of the basis for the decision, that the issues, evidence, 
and processes were meaningful to the outcome. This reason giving 
is necessary, both to redeem prior promises of rationality, and to 
provide guidance for the individual’s future planning. In this latter 
aspect, reason giving confirms the participant, even in the face of 
substantive disappointment, as engaging in an ongoing process of 
rational and self-regarding action.103 
The Cunningham rule, of course, responds nicely to Mashaw’s rea-
son-giving imperative.104 
 This imperative acquires special force in the realm of criminal law 
for its connection to the rehabilitative project of the criminal justice 
system.105 In order to see why, it is helpful to consider what a large 
                                                                                                                    
that “[t]he best account of the dignitary value of participatory process has been developed 
by Jerry Mashaw.” 
 103. MASHAW, supra note 84, at 175-76. To be clear, Mashaw’s argument for reason-
giving demands no more than a thin form of rationality; it does not preclude decisions that 
are “mistaken or foolish in some—even many—cases.” Id. at 199. Yet, some sort of expla-
nation for the decision remains necessary if we are to conceive genuinely of the individual 
as an “autonomous moral agent entitled to self-respect.” Id. 
 104. A fuller defense of the Cunningham rule in Mashaw’s terms might look like this: 
Post-Booker sentencing promises that decisions will be based on the full panoply of 
§ 3553(a) factors and thereby invites argument and evidence that go beyond the scope of 
the guidelines. Where a defendant takes up this invitation, it hardly seems respectful to 
render a decision as to which there is no clear indication that the invited argument and 
evidence were even considered. Such a system seemingly cares little about living up to its 
promises to the defendant of a rational and participatory decisionmaking process, about 
providing the defendant with an ability to participate effectively in the later appellate 
process for review of the sentence, or about helping the defendant to understand the true 
moral significance of the punishment he or she is about to suffer. Cf. Schauer, supra note 
1, at 658 (discussing reason-giving as a way of showing respect). 
 105. The larger point suggested here is that criminal procedure requirements should 
be developed so as to complement the aims of substantive criminal law—a point that has 
also been effectively made by Professor Bibas. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substan-
tive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Conten-
dere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2003) (“A procedure may be constitutional, ef-
ficient, procedurally fair, and even accurate but still be deeply unwise. If the procedure 
undermines important values of substantive criminal law, we should reject it no matter 
how efficient it is.”). Although rehabilitation no longer plays the dominant role that it once 
did, it remains a core objective of the American criminal justice system. See Michael M. 
O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 433-35 (2008) [here-
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body of social psychology research teaches about procedural justice: 
when the people affected by a decisionmaking process perceive the 
process to be just, they are much more likely to accept the outcomes 
of the process, even when the outcomes are adverse.106 Moreover, ac-
ceptance of decisions made by legal actors is associated with higher 
levels of perceived legitimacy of the legal system as well as a height-
ened sense of obligation to obey the law and cooperate with legal au-
thorities.107 Such procedural justice effects have been found in a mul-
titude of studies involving a wide range of social groups in a wide va-
riety of different settings, including in the interactions of criminal 
defendants with their lawyers and police.108 Thus, there is good rea-
son to believe that procedural justice is capable of contributing to the 
internalization of the sorts of values that we would associate with 
rehabilitation. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized  
the intuitive appeal of this point with respect to parole  
revocation procedures.109 
 Procedural justice effects not only have an important connection 
to the rehabilitative project of criminal law, but also more broadly to 
the efficient functioning of the criminal justice system. As I have de-
scribed at greater length elsewhere, the nominally coercive machin-
ery of criminal justice depends to a surprising extent on the coopera-
tion of the defendants moving through the system.110 For instance, 
the investigation and prosecution functions benefit tremendously 
from high numbers of confessions and guilty pleas, as well as fre-
quent jailhouse snitching and testimony by defendants against code-
fendants. Likewise, given how probation departments are notoriously 
spread thin, the effective supervision of defendants on pretrial re-
lease, probation, and parole requires high levels of voluntary coop-
eration by defendants. All of this suggests that procedural justice—
with its capacity to increase compliance with the law and legal au-
thorities—can make important contributions to the criminal justice 
system’s basic objective of achieving efficient crime control. 
 And there are good reasons to think that the Cunningham rule 
will enhance perceptions of procedural justice.111 Social psychologist 
                                                                                                                    
inafter O’Hear, Plea Bargaining] (discussing the continuing importance of rehabilitation in 
American criminal justice systems). 
 106. For a more detailed summary of this research, see O’Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra 
note 105, at 420-24. 
 107. Id. at 421-22. 
 108. Id. at 422. 
 109. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (“And society has a further interest 
in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will en-
hance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.”). 
 110. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra note 105, at 433-35. 
 111. Adam Lamparello has also invoked procedural justice effects as a reason for more 
robust explanation requirements for federal sentences. However, he has done so within the 
context of a much broader reform proposal that would obviate the need for Cunningham by 
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Tom Tyler, a longtime leader in the procedural justice field, has iden-
tified various attributes of decisionmaking processes that are associ-
ated with lay perceptions of procedural justice, including the follow-
ing: (1) whether the people involved had an opportunity to state their 
case (“voice”); (2) whether the authorities were seen as unbiased, 
honest, and principled (“neutrality”); (3) whether the authorities 
were seen as benevolent and caring (“trustworthiness”); and (4) 
whether the people involved were treated with dignity and respect.112 
Explanation connects to at least two of these attributes. First, expla-
nation contributes to perceived neutrality to the extent that it dem-
onstrates that the decisionmaker was truly unbiased, honest, and 
principled.113 And, second, perceived trustworthiness is enhanced 
when the authorities demonstrate that they have actually considered 
the information offered during voice opportunities.114 Thus, the em-
pirical research on the content of procedural justice dovetails with 
more philosophical approaches, such as Mashaw’s.115 
 Importantly, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the very founda-
tion of modern federal sentencing law, was largely premised on the 
basic insight advanced in this Section: even when handing out long 
prison sentences, it is important for judges to treat defendants in a 
respectful manner in order to facilitate their successful adaptation to 
prison life and eventual rehabilitation. Although it is often asserted 
                                                                                                                    
eliminating any weight for the guidelines in the sentencing calculus. Adam Lamparello, 
Social Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical Foundations of Judgment: Importing the 
Procedural Justice Model to Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 115, 156-58 (2006). 
 112. Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation 
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
355, 380-82 (2003). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Impli-
cations for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 441 (1992) (“Without consid-
ering their arguments, people believe that the authority cannot be acting benevolently . . . .”). 
 115. This should not be surprising, as both approaches ultimately focus on dignity and 
respect. According to Tyler and his coauthor E. Allen Lind, the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the procedural justice effects are related to a basic human desire to maintain 
social status: because people “derive much of their social identity from their standing as 
full-fledged members of their group or society,” fair procedures matter to the extent that 
they convey positive messages as to social standing. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, Proce-
dural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 76 (Joseph Sanders & V. 
Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). As Mashaw suggests, explained decisions communicate a mes-
sage of respect for the autonomy and rationality of participants in the decisionmaking 
process, while an unexplained decision sends the opposite message—one that must be re-
garded as stigmatizing in a liberal-democratic political community. See MASHAW, supra 
note 84, at 176. Thus, an explained sentencing decision, even if adverse to the defendant, 
provides implicit reassurance to the defendant that he or she retains at least some mini-
mal level of social standing and thereby promotes the following: acceptance of the decision, 
trust in legal institutions, a sense of security as to “the long-term gains from group mem-
bership,” Tyler & Lind, supra, at 76, and a willingness to “invest . . . in an ordered society.” 
Id. at 77. 
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that the Act’s purpose was to reduce unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities,116 the statute’s legislative history reveals that minimizing 
disparity was not viewed as an end in itself.117 For instance, Marvin 
Frankel, whose 1973 book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order is 
widely regarded as the impetus for federal sentencing reform,118 
characterized disparity as an affront to defendant dignity.119 He ex-
pressed a concern that unrestrained judicial discretion at sentencing 
bred anger and anxiety among defendants, and he asserted that in-
consistencies in treatment fueled resentment among prison inmates, 
impairing their prospects for rehabilitation and contributing to out-
breaks of prison violence and disorder.120 Such concerns were then 
echoed in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on the Act, which 
expressed concerns regarding fairness to defendants, the tendency 
for disparities to promote disrespect for the law, and the evidence 
that disparities contributed to disciplinary problems in prisons.121 
Similarly, the statutory text itself requires judges to impose sen-
tences and the Commission to develop guidelines that take into ac-
count the need for sentences to “promote respect for the law” and to 
provide defendants with “correctional treatment in the most  
effective manner.”122 
 Taking into account this broader constellation of purposes—not 
just minimizing disparity per se but also treating defendants with 
due regard for their dignitary interests, enhancing defendants’ reha-
bilitative prospects, and contributing to orderly and effective correc-
tions administration—the Cunningham requirement seems perfectly 
congruent with the Sentencing Reform Act’s intended accomplishments. 
 What of the view (suggested by Rita) that, whatever the impor-
tance of responding to defendant arguments, those responses may 
generally be inferred from the context and circumstances of the case? 
Recall, for instance, the analysis of the record in Rita itself. Accord-
ing to the Court, the fact that the judge asked counsel questions re-
garding the defendant’s arguments reassures us that the judge actu-
ally did consider them, while the reasons they were rejected may be 
inferred from the essential nature of guidelines sentencing: “[T]he 
                                                                                                                    
 116. O’Hear, Original Intent of Uniformity, supra note 10, at 772-73. 
 117. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3235-36 (acknowledging that, while the primary goal of sentencing reform is to eliminate 
unwarranted sentencing disparity, guidelines requiring a judge to examine the character-
istics of a particular offense and defendant will actually enhance the individualization  
of sentences). 
 118. O’Hear, Original Intent of Uniformity, supra note 10, at 759. 
 119. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 11, 17 (1973). 
 120. Id. at 96-97. 
 121. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 45-46, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3228-29.  
 122. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (D) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006) (re-
quiring the Commission establish sentencing policies in conformance with § 3553(a)(2)). 
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Guidelines had determined a sentence that was proper in the min-
erun of roughly similar perjury cases; and . . . Rita’s personal circum-
stances here were simply not different enough to warrant a  
different sentence.”123 
 The problem with this reasoning is that the explanation inferred 
by the Court is both unhelpfully vague and not clearly any more 
plausible than a number of other possible explanations. In truth, one 
can easily imagine a number of different explanations for the judge’s 
decision, each of which would have its own distinct moral signifi-
cance.124 For instance, the judge may have decided that past military 
or public service of some sort is, as an empirical matter, routine 
among perjury defendants and therefore incapable of removing Rita 
from the “heartland” of perjury cases.125 Or the judge might have de-
cided that sentences must be based on retributive principles and that 
military service has no bearing on Rita’s just deserts. Or the judge 
might have decided that military service is not, as a general matter, 
indicative of good character. Or the judge might have decided that 
military service was as much an aggravating characteristic as a miti-
gating one, inasmuch as Rita’s service should have instilled in him a 
greater appreciation of law and order and of the sacrifices made by 
others to preserve these social values. 
 This analysis of Rita illustrates why, for an open-textured deci-
sionmaking process (such as the one contemplated by § 3553(a)), con-
text and circumstances will almost always be a poor substitute for 
express explanation. Of course, it will usually be possible to imagine 
a rational basis for the judge’s decision after the fact, but to find such 
a hypothetical explanation adequate (as was done in Rita) is to con-
flate procedural and substantive review. Properly understood, proce-
dural justice requires not just the possibility that the judge could 
have considered and rejected the defendant’s arguments on neutral, 
rational grounds, but also some meaningful reassurance that the 
judge actually did so. 
C.   Respecting Sixth Amendment Values 
 The proguidelines cognitive bias effects described in Part A are a 
concern not only from the standpoint of the substantive quality of 
sentencing decisions under § 3553(a), but also from the standpoint of 
                                                                                                                    
 123. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007). 
 124. Moreover, from the procedural justice perspective, the judge’s questioning of coun-
sel need not be construed in wholly positive terms: after all, the questioning invited a 
higher level of participation and implicitly promised even more by way of judicial consid-
eration of the defendant’s arguments. The subsequent failure to address those arguments 
as the sentence was imposed may thus constitute even more of a dignitary affront than if 
the arguments had initially evoked less attention. 
 125. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2461. 
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showing respect for core constitutional values. Recall that Booker in-
validated the mandatory guidelines system on Sixth Amendment 
grounds, making clear that the finding by judges of aggravating facts 
resulting in mandatory sentence enhancements violated defendants’ 
jury-trial rights.126 Booker and the other progeny of Apprendi v. New 
Jersey127 have embraced a vision of robust checks and balances in the 
criminal justice system128—of the need, as the Court put it in Blakely 
v. Washington,129 for a “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of jus-
tice.”130 Mandatory guidelines based on judicial factfinding contra-
vene this vision because no actor with discretionary authority (that 
is, neither a judge nor a jury) stands between the prosecutor and the 
defendant with the capacity to determine that a sentence enhance-
ment, although literally applicable, is nonetheless inappropriate in 
the specific case at hand.131 To the extent that the guidelines exert a 
special gravitational pull in the sentencing process—that is, to the 
extent that the guidelines have something of a de facto binding char-
acter—the guidelines subtly undermine these Sixth Amendment values. 
 Although these concerns may not rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, the desire for checks and balances that undergirds 
the jury-trial right surely merits attention in determining what con-
stitutes a reasonable sentencing process. A system in which judges 
categorically decline to second-guess guidelines-mandated sentence 
enhancements is not a system that respects Sixth Amendment val-
ues, but is rather one dominated by prosecutors (in the sense that on-
ly prosecutors exercise meaningful discretion in the distribution of 
punishment). And when judges fail to explain their rejection of de-
fendants’ arguments for below-guidelines sentences, we have little 
assurance that judges are doing anything but categorically following 
the guidelines. 
 Of course, this may be a misperception: the unexplained sentence 
may have a good, if unarticulated, explanation, and discretion may 
have been truly exercised. Yet, as the Supreme Court has recognized 
in other contexts, the public has an important interest in maintain-
ing the appearance that officeholders appropriately discharge their 
                                                                                                                    
 126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 127. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 128. Michael M. O’Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi  
to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 875-76 (2006) [hereinafter O’Hear, End  
of Bordenkircher]. 
 129. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 130. Id. at 306. 
 131. See O’Hear, End of Bordenkircher, supra note 128, at 858-60 (discussing how 
mandatory sentencing regimes take the discretionary authority away from juries). None-
theless, as I have explained elsewhere, a jury in a mandatory sentencing guidelines system 
can still perform the requisite circuitbreaking role through the exercise of its nullification 
power. Id. 
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duties.132 Moreover, the social psychology research suggests an addi-
tional reason to be concerned about perceptions here: procedural jus-
tice effects are promoted when decisionmakers clearly acknowledge 
the legal rights of those affected by their decisions, but may be un-
dermined by the perception that the rights are not taken seriously.133 
Thus, a defendant’s perception (whether or not accurate) that his or 
her judge automatically applied the guidelines, without regard to his 
or her Sixth Amendment rights, may diminish the defendant’s sense 
of respect for the law and the legal system. 
D.   Improving the Quality of the Guidelines 
 From their inception, the guidelines were intended to be devel-
oped through an evolutionary process in which empirical data would 
inform ongoing improvements in the guidelines system.134 Through 
their case-by-case sentencing decisions, district court judges were 
recognized from the start as an important source of such empirical 
data. As the original edition of the guidelines put it, “By monitoring 
when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated 
reasons for doing so, the Commission, over time, will be able to create 
more accurate guidelines . . . .”135 
 The Commission’s interest in collecting and analyzing district 
court reasoning makes sense. District court judges occupy a unique 
position in the federal criminal justice system. Their perspective is 
more like that of a prosecutor or public defender than that of an ap-
pellate judge, inasmuch as they see many more criminal cases than 
appellate judges and in much richer detail. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, district court judges routinely get to see the faces and hear 
the voices of defendants, defendants’ family members, victims, and 
frontline law enforcement personnel. Yet, they remain life-tenured 
judges—freed from the strictures of the advocate’s role and largely 
insulated from political and bureaucratic pressures. This unique per-
spective (although one that is, of course, limited in its own ways) 
provides the district court judge with important insights into such 
matters as the relative severity of different types of offenses, the ef-
                                                                                                                    
 132. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in 
Buckley of the perception of corruption inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions . . . as a source of concern almost equal to quid pro quo improbity . . . .” (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 133. See Tyler, supra note 114, at 440-41. 
 134. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 1A1.1 ed. note (reprinting introductory 
note to original 1987 edition of Guidelines Manual, at A.3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) 
(2006) (providing that one of the purposes of the Sentencing Commission includes estab-
lishing sentencing policies and practices that “reflect, to the extent practicable, advance-
ment in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process”). 
 135. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 1A1.1 ed. note (reprinting introductory 
note to original 1987 edition of Guidelines Manual, at A.4.B). 
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fects of incarceration on defendants and defendants’ families, the 
significance of apology, the structure of criminal organizations, and 
the exercise of discretion by police and prosecutors. In its ongoing 
process of analysis and guidelines improvement, the Commission 
may benefit a great deal from such insights.136 
 Before Booker, however, the cramped nature of the departure ju-
risprudence did little to encourage judges to say much when they re-
fused to depart,137 leaving unrealized the vision of a robust role for 
district courts in the policymaking process. Booker, of course, holds 
the potential for a much enhanced feedback loop, but only if district 
court judges actually share their insights on the record. Their inter-
est in putting their analysis on the record conflicts with, as Judge 
Posner puts it, “the temptation to a busy judge to impose the guide-
lines sentence and be done with it.”138 For this reason, the Cunning-
ham requirement may help policymakers by inducing district court 
judges to fight this temptation, think more carefully about individual 
cases in light of their experiences in sentencing many other cases, 
and draw explicit connections between their personal insights and 
the § 3553(a) factors. Putting all of this reasoning on the record can 
only help the evolutionary process that guidelines development is in-
tended to be.139 
                                                                                                                    
 136. As Professor Chanenson has argued, the appellate courts, Congress, and the pub-
lic would also benefit from the information that district court judges might convey in more 
thorough explanations of their sentencing decisions. Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 147-48 (2006). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Castano-Vasquez, 266 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2001) (not-
ing that district court judge was not obligated to explain a refusal to depart); Douglas A. 
Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for 
Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (1999) (“By its own hand, the judici-
ary has undermined or simply underused the mechanisms which were intended to foster 
judicial involvement in the [Sentencing Reform Act’s] evolutionary lawmaking process.”). 
 138. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 139. The Cunningham requirement may also enhance the quality of prosecutors’ work. 
As Professor Simons has observed, although federal prosecutors have long possessed tre-
mendous discretion in charging, they have not traditionally connected the exercise of that 
discretion with the punishment theory. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment 
Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 305 (2009). Simons sees 
Booker as hopeful development in this regard: now “prosecutors must engage with the tra-
ditional purposes of sentencing—if only to oppose defense requests for sentences below the 
advisory Guidelines range.” Id. at 349. He suggests that Booker may thereby contribute to 
more carefully targeted uses of sentence enhancement statutes: “Booker, by forcing prose-
cutors to engage with the basic principles of punishment, now provides a framework for 
prosecutors to think about the justice of sentencing enhancements.” Id. at 351. However, it 
is hard to see how motivated prosecutors will be to engage seriously with the § 3553(a) fac-
tors if judges do not seem so engaged. But, if judges explain their variance rulings as a 
matter of course, then prosecutors may see variance issues as warranting more careful at-
tention. Moreover, the feedback provided by judges in their explanations should help 
prosecutors to become (using Simons’ term) even better “punishment theorists.” 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 In the post-Booker world, federal sentencing decisions are now 
recognized as discretionary ones, but they are unlike the myriad of 
other discretionary decisions that district court judges make day in 
and day out: issuing scheduling orders, resolving discovery disputes, 
making evidentiary rulings, and the like. Not only are the stakes 
much higher when a sentence is imposed, but the decision is embed-
ded within a unique and complex set of legal mandates and public 
policy concerns, including the need to ensure that the full range of 
§ 3553(a) factors are given due attention, to promote procedural jus-
tice effects, to reassure defendants that their Sixth Amendment 
rights are being respected, and to provide a robust feedback loop to 
the Commission consistent with the vision of evolutionary sentencing 
guidelines. Thus, while the costs of a strong explanation requirement 
may appropriately be viewed as prohibitive with respect to more run-
of-the-mill types of judicial decisions, the sentencing-specific consid-
erations described here may warrant a different conclusion in the 
sentencing context. 
 Because the courts have not focused on what is unique about sen-
tencing, the explanation requirements for federal sentences have 
been degraded, as Professor Oldfather has characterized explanation 
norms generally, to “little more than incantations designed to assure 
the public . . . that those responsible for adjudication understand 
what their obligations entail.”140 When it comes to sentencing deci-
sions, our courts of appeals can and should be more demanding. In 
particular, the appellate courts can highlight the importance of ex-
planation by taking Cunningham-type claims more seriously instead 
of summarily rejecting the claims based on dubious distinctions (e.g., 
whether the ignored argument was the defendant’s principal one) 
and unnecessary procedural obstacles (e.g., the contemporaneous ob-
jection requirement). Rita’s embrace of inferred explanations should 
also be reconsidered, although that step may have to await action by 
the Supreme Court.141 
 The more general point is that our courts should more consis-
tently recognize the unique importance of the sentencing process. 
                                                                                                                    
 140. Oldfather, supra note 1, at 764. 
 141. I say “may” because it is possible to read Rita not as prescribing how reasonable-
ness review must be conducted, but as a grant of discretion to the courts of appeals to de-
termine for themselves how to review sentences post-Booker. Notably, the Court permitted 
the courts of appeals to employ a presumption of reasonableness for guidelines sentences, 
but it did not require such a presumption. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting use of presumption in Ninth Circuit post-Rita); Rita v. 
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007) (“The most important question before us is 
whether the law permits the courts of appeals to use this presumption. We hold that it 
does.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, Rita might be read to permit explanations to be in-
ferred, but not as requiring the lower appellate courts to do so. 
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The American tradition is to load up the criminal trial with proce-
dural safeguards, but to leave sentencing largely untouched by for-
mal procedural requirements.142 The advent of sentencing guidelines 
served to regularize the process a bit, but the guidelines system ul-
timately adopted procedures more akin to civil or administrative ad-
judications than to a criminal trial.143 The enduring contribution of 
Apprendi, Booker, and related Supreme Court cases has been to re-
mind us that sentencing truly is a criminal proceeding and that con-
cerns regarding judicial economy must accordingly give way more 
quickly in the sentencing context than in civil and administrative 
proceedings.144 The particular concerns we have for a careful, respect-
ful process when a criminal defendant’s guilt is determined have 
much the same urgency when a sentence is selected and imposed. 
This is not to say that a sentencing proceeding must look exactly like 
a criminal trial, but it is to suggest that the sentencing process ought 
to embody a comparable level of dedication to doing both substantive 
and procedural justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 142. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1949) (holding that use of 
hearsay evidence at sentencing does not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 143. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 6A1.3 (establishing that admissibility of 
evidence at a sentencing hearing is not governed by rules of evidence and, in commentary, 
advising that factual disputes be resolved by preponderance of the evidence standard). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (acknowledging that 
jury factfinding “may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants”); 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002) (observing in extending jury-trial right to capital 
sentencing proceedings that the Sixth Amendment right “has never been efficient; but it 
has always been free” (citation omitted)). 
